By Pradipta Tapadar

Sukna (West Bengal), July 18 (IANS)Sukna (West Bengal), July 18 (IANS) An elated Roshan Gurung, 60, who runs a teashop, was Monday looking forward to peace, development and that crucial stamp of “identity” ahead of a historic tripartite agreement for the Darjeeling hills.

“We are very happy about the agreement. We suffer from identity crisis. I hope this treaty will bring peace and development in the hills,” said Gurung, a Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) supporter in Darjeeling district.

However, he and many others wished the demarcation of Gorkha majority areas in the Terai plains and Dooars region - which are also part of Darjeeling, besides the hills - had been carried out before the treaty was signed here between the GJM, the West Bengal government and New Delhi.

Gorkhas are the dominant ethnic community in the Darjeeling hills where a lot of people were euphoric Monday, hoping the treaty would solve their problems of unemployment, underdevelopment and poverty.

“We are happy because this treaty means more development and employment. There has been no basic teacher recruitment since 2000. We are unemployed even after receiving teacher’s training,” said B.M. Bariely, president of the Unemployed Trained Basic Teacher’s Association.

“We want better education for our children. This agreement is key to that dream. We don’t want tension in the hills. We want peace and a better future,” said Binod Rai.

At the core of the Darjeeling agreement is the formation of a new autonomous elected Hill Council Gorkha Territorial Administration (GTA), which is armed with more powers compared to its predecessor Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) formed in the late 1980s.

A nine-member high powered committee, comprising four members each from GJM and the state government and one from the central government, will be formed to study the GJM’s demand on demarcating Gorkha majority areas in the Terai (the plains of Darjeeling district) and Dooars (foothills covering parts of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts) for inclusion in the council.

“What if they (state and central governments) don’t give us any area after the demarcation committee in case of a report against area demarcation? The treaty should have been signed after area demarcation was done,” said Sujan Rai, an ex-serviceman.

He took active part in the agitation for a separate state of Gorkhaland to be carved out of Darjeeling and parts of neighbouring Jalpaiguri district.

The Darjeeling hills have periodically been on the boil for about three decades after the demand for Gorkhaland covering parts of northern Bengal gained momentum during the 1980s.

“We want nothing less than Gorkhaland. This treaty is a temporary solution. We want our own identity. We are not outsiders. We are Indians. Only a separate state will solve the problem,” said Ramesh Rai, a small-time businessman in the Darjeeling district hills that comprises the three sub-divisions of Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong.

But by and large there was a sense of hope. The GJM leadership seemed very happy.

“I am certain this agreement will have a positive impact in the region. The DGHC (Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council) had no functional powers but this body will fulfil the demand of greater autonomy to the region,” said Urmila Rumaba, core committee member of the GJM’s Nari Morcha.

The Gorkhaland movement took off under the leadership of Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) supremo Subash Ghising. But the reins of the movement were taken over by the Bimal Gurung-led GJM, which forced Ghising out of the hills.

The three-decade long anti-government protests have witnessed killings, police crackdowns, long shutdowns which severely impacted the hill’ economic mainstays - tea, timber and tourism. The people are hoping this will be reversed.

“We want development of the hills, both in terms of the tourism business and tea gardens. We are happy that this agreement will usher in the long pending development of the hills,” said Romila Thapa, a resident of the area.

The ‘India Blooms News Service’ reports the following

Darjeeling/Siliguri/Jalpaiguri, Feb 11 (IBNS) Life remained shut for the third consecutive day in the hills of Darjeeling on Friday while scarcity of essential commodities became acute as the indefinite strike, called by the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha, continued.

Uncertainty continued to prevail in the three hill-subdivisions of Darjeeling, Kurseong and Kalimpong besides the Terai and Dooras in Jalpaiguri district of north Bengal over recurring clashes between pro-Gorkahnd and anti-Gorkhaland supporters and vandalising government property over the past three days.

The shutdown has been called protesting the February 8 police firing at Sipchu in Jalpaiguri in which two Morcha supporters were killed.

Transport movement to Sikkim and rest of the northeast continued to be affected.

The government has clamped prohibitory orders in several places of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts to prevent rival forces from organizing rallies.

The GJM has been attempting to organise rally in support of ‘Gorkhaland’ and highlight the police firing, while the tribals of the plains and Bangla O Bangla Bhasha Banchao Committee members are opposing division of West Bengal.

An anti-Gorkhaland march to the hills, ‘Darjeeling Chalo’, was prevented by police on Thursday by detaining about 150 participants at the Tenzing Norgay bus terminus in Siliguri.

Life has almost collapsed in the hills with no vehicles plying, government offices remaining shut, business coming to a halt and stocks of ration dwindling fast with no supply coming from the plains.

The silence prevailing in the area was occasionally broken by the screech of security vehicles as the Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police Force jawans intensified patrolling.

Schools along NH 55 between Siliguri and Sukna remained open today as the Morcha allowed students to travel only in school vehicles.

The GJM said said it would allow outstation students, appearing for board examinations, but the vehicles carrying them must have ‘on exam duty’ stickers pasted on them.

But inadequate logistical support make the school authorities doubtful about the exams being held successfully.

Several nationalised banks, which are the custodians of question papers, are shut due to the strike.

The institutions have requested boards to allow an exemption and permit the main exam centres in each area to keep the question papers.

The ISC practical exams in science subjects are scheduled to start on Monday and many outstation students have not been able to return to their schools because of the strike.

Around 500 students are expected to sit for the ISC practical exams.

Jalpaiguri district magistrate Bandana Yadav refused to give permission for a GJM rally, proposed to be taken towards Jaigon on Friday.

The administration would not give any permission to anyone for holding public meeting or a rally at this situation after Sipchu violence, she said.

The Maoists say it will be the biggest demonstration since they quit the government last year. Supporters, many dressed in red, are housed in hundreds of schools and are being provided training on how to use sticks as well as martial arts.

The constituent assembly has until May 28 to agree the new constitution but the government may miss the deadline leaving a political vacuum.

Some analysts say the sticking point behind the stalemate was how to settle the future of more than 19,000 Maoist former fighters . The Maoists want them to join the security forces while the government refuses.

My representative in Kathmandu has just sent me the following excerpts from a paper by Saubhagya Shah delivered at a seminar in Kathmandu under the auspices of the National Media Development Center (NMDC) and FE5 Nepal on Sept. 20, 2008; Harvard Ph.D. Saubhagya Shah is the program coordinator Conflict Peace and Development Studies at the Tribhuvan University, Nepal.

Saubhagya Shah, PhD

A major irony in Nepal at present is that despite the impressive governing alliance and the strong backing accorded to it by New Delhi and the Western powers, the government has never been so weak. The judiciary has been put under the executive; the large Constituent Assembly has been reduced to a rubber stamp for the wishes of the ruling caucus; and there is acute demoralization in the civil service and the police. The military continues to be treated as a pariah by the new regime and the civil society. The fragmentation and weakening of the various organs of the Nepali state has several major implications for the democratic transition, political stability, and economic growth. Internally, the failure to implement rule of law, curb spiraling crime wave, check the rising political violence in society, and ensuring the flow of essential supplies is leaving the population feeling insecure and vulnerable. The restoration of formal political freedom has not gone hand in had with the reassurance of security and liberty at the individual and community level.

Externally, the new regime has become extremely susceptible to external pressures and influences. There is a general impression that no decisions or appointments are being taken without external approval. The direct involvement of the Indian Embassy in the deal reached between the UDMF and the government on February 28, 2008 and the subsequent handing over of Upper Karnali and Arun III river projects to India are examples of enfeeblement of the Nepali state which adds to the growing sense of insecurity, demoralization, and lack of direction.

The ongoing state disorder and public frustration has usually been explained away as unavoidable transitional pangs that will pass away as democracy consolidates in Nepal. While such a linear view of democratic transition appears intuitive and assuring, comparative study of political transitions after the collapse of authoritarian regimes does not appear to support this view (Linz and Stepan 2000, 0’ Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Bruce 2005). For example, after examining a large number of regime changes that occurred in the “third wave of democracy”, Thomas Carothers (2000) concludes that a sequential move from regime collapse, transition, and democratic consolidation is not a historic eventuality. The sequence can be delayed, disrupted, or diverted by a number of factors chief of which are the absence of foundational consensus on the form and content of the nation-state, a “usable state” apparatus, and adequate security. In the Nepali context, all these three variables have become either absent or are under severe challenge. Between successful democratic consolidation and outright failure, Carothers posits that many of the cases enter the ambiguous “grey zone” where transition itself becomes the normal condition. If the present developments are any indication, the grey zone in Nepal is likely to have a dash of red as well.

The enfeeblement of the Nepali state, both internally and externally, will be a major handicap in ensuring successful conflict transformation, political transition, and democratic consolidation. Some of the worrying signs are the ongoing arms race among the political parties in setting up of and mobilization of youth squads framed around the paramilitary concept. After the Maoist set up the YCL, the UML launched its own Youth Force, and the NC has followed suit with Tarun Dasta who function as shock troops by employing coercive and intimidatory tactics. By taking the law into their own hands, these units often substitute for the state’s legal process. The recent skirmish between the home minister and the Land Reform minister in Siraha is a case in point. The emerging fracture within the state apparatus is a serious trend. After the onset of the insurgeny in Nepal in 1996, the conflict took on a bipolar form between the political parties and the Maoist rebels (Shah 2004). After the palace became active in the political process, Nepal’s crisis took on a triangular character until the formation of the alliance between the political parties and the Maoists in 2005 to fight the king which again restored the bipolar nature of conflict. With the demise of monarchy in 2008, it is likely that Nepal is heading into a multi-polar conflict scenario with the weakening state unable to regulate or moderate the different interests groups working both inside and outside of the constitutional framework.

As the state capacity is gradually being eroded, individual political parties and groups are becoming stronger. When these practices are generalized and normalized, what will emerge is not a civil or liberal but a muscular democracy not very accessible or particularly friendly to the poor, excluded, or the marginalized.